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Executive summary 
“Up to 80% of global trade is supported by some form of financing or credit insurance”, Roberto Azevêdo, 
WTO Director-General, in opening the seminar on “Trade Finance in Developing Countries” at the WTO on 
26 March 2015. WTO estimates global trade around USD18 trillions 
 
Trade and its growth critically depends on access to funding. This is especially true for Asia, the largest 
trading region and the first market for trade finance. 
In this report, we first assess the state of trade finance market in Asia, then we identify the latest trend. 
We conclude by providing a synopsis of the necessary steps that will help sustain trade growth in emerging 
Asia and insure its impact on GDP growth. The key points are as follows: 
 
- The impact of trade liberalization on countries ‘growth is very short lives in absence of 
financial deregulations 
 
- Trade in Asian countries relies heavily on letters of credit (L/Cs) which leaves a lot of unmet 
credit needs, especially for SMEs. 
- Several alternatives are slowly emerging, from banks (factoring, supply chain finance), but 
also from non- banks (Global and Regional Value chains and inter-firm trade credit). 
 
- On the investors’ side, trade receivable assets (via securitization or direct investment) is 
considered as an possibly attractive alternative due to new financial regulation and low 
interest rate.  
 
-  Trade receivable assets offer attractive alpha yield opportunities, consistent returns, low 
volatility, “real Economy” investment and lower defaults rates than any other interest based 
asset class, and a behavior uncorrelated to the market. 
 
- Policy recommendations to help expanding lenders and investors/capital pool:  
o Streamlining the trade finance process, 
o Uniformisation of international regulations  
o Strengthening of the institutions helping to mitigate risk  
o Dematerialization of the process (use of technology) 
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Introduction 
 
“Up to 80% of global trade is supported by some form of financing or credit insurance”, Roberto 
Azevêdo, WTO Director-General, in opening the seminar on “Trade Finance in Developing 
Countries” at the WTO on 26 March 2015. WTO estimates global trade around USD18 trillions. 
 
The resurgence of international trade treaty discussions confirms the perception that trade is 
one of tomorrow’s engine of growth. However, without a strengthened access to trade finance 
or trade credit for SMEs, especially in less developed economies, the impact of these treaties 
will remain limited.  
 
While the main markets have reverted to normal conditions, this return has been uneven. In its 
latest survey on the subject, the Asia Development Bank (ADB) reports growing rejection rate 
of funding requests from Asia, especially SMEs. Its estimates the unmet global demand for trade 
finance for developing Asia could be as high as $1.1 trillion in 2013.2 Being the largest user of 
trade finance globally, Asian economy also strongly relies on its SMEs as they generate up to 
50% of the Asia-Pacific GDP while employing up to 50% of the labor force. The lack of access to 
funding is often identified as the reason why SMEs account for only 35% or less of direct exports. 
From the supply side, the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) Global Survey 2014 
confirms such findings: respondent banks acknowledge a shortfall in global trade finance supply 
for SMEs and identify increasing compliance and regulatory burden as one of the key 
impediment to trade finance.3  
 
The Asian-Pacific region became the “ biggest trading region in the world, in terms of both 
imports and exports, overtaking Europe in 2012”, accounting for close to 36% of global 
merchandise export and import. 4 In 2013, close to half of the trade of merchandise of the Asian-
Pacific region was intraregional, while the share of the region in global exports of commercial 
services was 27.7%. Six countries claim the majority share (67.5%): China; Hong Kong, China; 
India, Japan, the Republic of Korea and Singapore. The establishment of the ASEAN Economic 
Community, targeted for December 2015, should strengthen such a trend by lowering trade 
barriers between countries in Southeast Asia. This single market should ensure free flow of 
goods, services, investment and skilled labor and capital. This would be the latest of several 
agreements that took place since 2000 with ASEAN main trade partners such as Australia, China, 
Indian, Korean, and New Zealand.  
 
However, previous experiences have shown that the impact of trade liberalization on countries 
‘growth is very short lives in absence of financial deregulations. Peter and Schnitzer(2012) 
illustrate this with to the North American Free-Trade Agreement, “after the trade agreement, 
                                                          
2 The Asian Development Bank (2014) estimates that close to 2/3 of that amount can be attributed to China and India. 
3 ICC global survey (2014) is based on data from 298 banks in 127 countries. 
4  UN ESCAP (2014)  
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Mexico increase its GDP and its exports. However, due to institutional gaps, in particular credit 
market development, the productivity gap with respect to the USA and Canada did not close”. 
Furthermore, Chang et al. (2009) show that financial and trade liberalization tend to amplify 
each other impact on growth. In the ASEAN case, the trade integration requires financial 
integration. The ASEAN Financial Integration Framework (AFIF) has been approved in 2011 and 
has a target end-date of 2020. However in a recent intervention, Ravi Menon, Managing 
Director of the Monetary Authority of Singapore expressed his concern regarding the slow 
development observed in the AFIF.5 
 
This report investigates the latest developments in trade finance in Asia, with a focus on ASEAN 
countries. Asian trade strongly relies on bank intermediated trade finance. However, such tools 
tend to focus on firms’ credit worthiness and are unable to accommodate a large part of the 
SMEs’ requests, especially in the less developed ASEAN countries. As a result, several 
alternatives such as inter-firm credit or Global and Regional Values Chain are becoming more 
popular. The financial crisis, its subsequent financial regulations and the US new compliance 
rules have also a significant impact on trade finance in Asia. The withdraw of European banks 
allows regional banks to gain market share, yet the fragmented infrastructure and support 
system (banking, insurance, advice, network) is one of the main concern when it comes to SMEs 
and less developed countries access to funds. We argue that the regional effort of integration 
must be combined with procedure standardization and dematerialization. Simultaneously, 
policy makers should create an international set of criteria to streamline the trade finance 
process. These proposals will help widening the pool of lenders and investors.  
 
In this report, we proceed as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of trade finance while 
focusing on the Asia’s specificities, especially the reshaping of its banking landscape as a 
byproduct of new financial regulations.  Section 3 discusses trade finance as a class of assets 
while section 4 concludes on few recommendations tailored to the ASEAN region. 
Finance trade in Asia 
State of the Market 
International trade must work around a fundamental dilemma: how to bridge the time gap 
between when the exporter wishes to be paid and when the importer will pay for the 
merchandise. Trade finance (letter of credit (L/Cs), documentary collection, import and export 
loans…), trade credit (cash-in-advance and open accounts) and export credit insurance are key 
elements in facilitating such transactions. Box 1 lists some useful definitions. These alternatives 
exist to protect both importer and exporter from the risks, such as non-completion or foreign 
exchange risk, as well as to provide means of financing. 
[INSERT BOX 1 HERE] 
 
                                                          
5 Menon (2015) 
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The lack of uniform data makes the estimation of the trade finance’s composition rather difficult 
and imprecise. So far, the consensus among the IMF, the BAFT-IFSA, the BIS and the ICC is that 
the bank-intermediated transaction represents between 30% and 50% while inter-firm trade 
credit funds the rest.6 Asia Pacific is the region relying the most heavily on trade finance: a 
measure of the usage intensity, column “percentage of merchandize trade” in Table 1, reports 
an estimated average between 36% and 40% for the world compared to 47%, 41% and 56% for 
China, India and Korea, respectively. Furthermore, Asia accounts for more than 50% of L/Cs’ 
usage.7 This regional specificity has various logistic and economic roots such as long distance 
trade transactions between partners, level of local market efficiency, weaker legal and 
contractual systems, less financial development and higher political risk, historical preferences, 
costs of operating through L/Cs, etc. Ahn (2015) emphasizes that most of the countries in the 
Asian-Pacific region have foreign exchange regulations or strict banking regulations, and that 
some governments, such as in China, use explicit policy requirements favoring L/Cs. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
 
Heavy reliance on these traditional modes of payment is no longer sufficient to meet market 
requirements and unmet credit needs: Asia, especially SMEs, cumulates the most unfunded 
requests.8 Hence several alternatives are emerging, whether they are provided mostly by banks, 
such as factoring, or by non-banks such as global and regional chain values and intra-firm trade 
credit. 
 
Factoring is an asset-based financing method for increasing working capital.  A factor (80% of 
the Factors Chain International are commercial banks) can assist an exporter with financing 
through the purchase of invoices or accounts receivable: the factor purchases the exporter’s 
short-term foreign accounts receivable for cash at a discount from the face value. It assumes 
the risk on the ability of the foreign buyer to pay, and handles collections on the receivables. By 
focusing on the value of the receivables instead of the firm’s creditworthiness, factoring is a 
great alternative to loans for SMEs. It is gaining popularity in Asia-Pacific, representing close to 
30% of the global cross-border factoring volume in 2013 compared to 12% in 2007. Figure 1 also 
shows a change in the Asian key players: Japan which used to be the Asian leader in factoring 
in 2007 is, in 2013, at the same level than Taiwan while China takes the lead accounting for 12% 
of the world factoring market and 63% of the Asian market.9  
                                                          
6 As a share of global trade, the Group’s estimate is somewhat lower than what has been reported from surveys 
conducted by the IMF and BAFT-IFSA (2009, 2010, 2011)). In those surveys, participating banks estimated that about 
40% of global trade was supported by bank-intermediated trade finance, with the remainder funded on an open 
account or cash-in-advance basis. On the other hand, some industry studies put the share of trade covered by trade 
finance much lower, at around 20%. 
7 See BIS (2014) 
8 See ADB(2014) and Enterprise survey (2014). 
9 Forfaiting is another alternative based on receivable discounting, it typically involves medium-term accounts receivables for 
exporters of capital goods or commodities with long credit periods. 
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[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE] 
The emergence of preferential trade agreement since 2000 facilitates the development of 
Global and Regional Value Chains (GCVs and RCVs) in the region, as an alternative to the bank 
intermediated trade finance.10 GCVs refers to the full range of cross-border, value-added 
business activities that are required to bring a product or service from the conception, design, 
sourcing raw material, and intermediate inputs stages, to production, marketing, distribution 
and supplying the final consumer. Many regional enterprises have participated in GVCs, 
especially in the sectors of automotive, electronics, food and apparel/garment. So far, Asia-
Pacific SMEs play a limited role due to low value-addiction and lack of proper network.11 
 
Finally, inter-firm trade credit is an alternative system relying on business relationship and 
trust between importers and exporters. It uses either open account or cash-in-advance. While 
this type of transactions entails lower fees and more flexibility, it has a higher payment risks. 
As a result, most of the firms using this solution have either well-established commercial 
relations or, given the expanding role of global multinational companies, are affiliated 
companies. So far, these flows remain relatively small. 
 
Who are the lenders: regional versus international?  
The recent financial crisis as well as the subsequent financial regulations (Basell III, Know You 
Customer, Dobb-Frank…) forced a deleveraging process, especially for European banks. See Box 
2 for a detailed illustration on the impact on the Asian syndicated loan market. The short-term 
nature of trade finance, 90 days for L/Cs and 105 for loans, makes it an easy target when banks 
need to reduce rapidly their exposures. Figure 2 shows the withdrawal of European banks 
allowed regional banks to build market share: the European banks reduce their deal 
participation from close to 90% in 2007 to 50% in 2014. In contrast, Asian banks led close to 
50% (31% of which is Japanese banks) of the deals in 2014 compared to around 10% on 2007. 
For several regional banks, such a window of opportunity became part their ongoing 
international expansion in the key emerging market regions, especially with the rise of South-
South trade. Besides providing support to the trading activities of domestic corporations, as 
follow-your-client strategies, trade finance allows new comers to build client relationships and, 
eventually, to offer a wider range of banking services. American and Australian banks also gain 
market shares.  
 
[INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE] 
 
[INSERT BOX 2 HERE] 
 
 
                                                          
10 Since 2000, more than 70 preferential trade agreements have been signed so far, the bulk being bilateral but a growing share is 
plurilateral. See Baldwin and Kawai (2013). 
11 See ESCAP(2007) and WTO(2013), Global value chains in a change in world 
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Trade Finance Assets 
Securitization 
Banks’ lending capacities are under pressure mainly for two reasons. First, the growth of trade 
generates a growth in demand in trade finance that is not compensated by the introduction of 
new financial intuitions. Second, Basel III regulatory demands (raised capital requirements, 
reduced leverage and placed liquidity requirements on banks) provide a new incentive for banks 
to either reduce trade finance exposure or to find an alternative to remove them for their 
balance sheet. The later may explain the recent surge of securitization deals as reported in Table 
3. By establishing an origination and funding platform for trade banks with global market 
position, securitization programs can help them addressing challenges such as capital 
management, liquidity, increased credit constraints and the new capital requirements. Banks 
have the ability to fund their originated trade finance assets in a capital and balance sheet 
efficient manner through issuances of medium- term asset backed securities, enabling them to 
increase the efficiency of their capital dedicated to trade.12 
 
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
 
Global trade finance assets are estimated around at $14-16 trillions, only a small bit of which 
has been securitized.  In comparison, the size of the U.S. mortgage loan market is about $13 
trillion, 65% of which are securitized into either agency or non-agency MBS.13 The potential for 
securitization is reinforced by the record low default rate of trade finance assets: the average 
default rate on short-term international trade credit ranges from 0.03% to 0.2%, with a recovery 
rate of 60%, when comparable corporate bond default rate ranges from 0.5% to 4.6%. (See 
Table 3) Although investors are attracted by the low-risk nature of trade finance assets, they 
also require granularity and diversity in the underlying reference pools to avoid cases such as 
the BNP Paribas Lighthouse vehicle: focusing on energy commodities from Eastern Europe, it 
ended early due to the Ukrainian crisis, as it lacked the trade finance deals needed to support 
the structure. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE] 
 
As things stand, the Citibank-Santander issuance, MAPS 1, is the first to use a joint-origination 
model, allowing great scale and country diversification in its underlying pool of trade assets, as 
well as better access to dollar funding for participating banks. (see Table 4)14 The creation of a 
much larger inter–bank securitization pool, larger than any single bank can possibly provide, 
increases diversity and lowers concentration risk for investors. Yet, the average loan size of the 
MAPS 1 securitization is rather large, above $140 million. More recently, the IIG Trade Finance 
                                                          
12 Citigroup (2011). 
13 Agency MBS are securitized or guaranteed by Government-Sponsored Entities (e.g. Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Federal Housing 
Administration, etc.), while non-agency MBS are securitized by private mortgage conduits. 
14 Santander has a strong presence in Latin America and Europa whereas Citibank provided the United States and Asia exposure. 
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proposes an alternative program, the first to use a pool of trade finance loans structured by a 
non-bank, openly interested in including small and medium sized trade-oriented enterprises: 
up to 85% of the notes are backed by short-term trade finance loan advances to small and 
medium-size enterprises engaged in the processing/export of physical commodities, such as 
cotton, frozen beef, frozen shrimp/seafood, powdered milk and soybean meal.15 
 
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE] 
 
Finally, yield is a key factor for investors. To achieve higher yields than traditional trade finance 
business can normally offer, the collaterized loan obligations are sliced into tranches, allowing 
a ‘high yield’ piece. Hans Krohn, Head of Trade Products at Commerzbank, describes the CoTrax 
deal as follows: the pool of assets was sliced into a senior tranche, a first loss piece, which 
Commerzbank kept, and a US$27 million mezzanine tranche; US$22 million of which was 
successfully placed with intuitional investors. Similarly, in the Citi MAPs structure, a total of four 
classes of notes publicly rated by Standard & Poor's and Fitch Ratings were sold.  The investment 
grade tranches were floated at one month Libor + 70-225 bps, while the B/BB tranche was 
priced at one month libor + 500 bps.  By comparison, the average floater spread of AAA global 
bond instruments was one month Libor + 37 bps, and one month Libor +178 bps for BBB-rated 
instruments.16 
Potential and challenges of trade finance investments  
Regulatory and compliance arbitrages as well as yield-search, especially in the current low 
interest rates environment, have moved trade finance and its multi trillion market into sights of 
institutional investors. As previously discussed, trade finance instruments range from direct to 
securitized investments, while most trade finance loans have a short duration and are 
sponsored by large corporations or B2B and Supplier network. Some long-term options, 10 to 
12 years, also exist to finance large-scale trade among firms like Airbus SAS, Boeing Co. and 
General Electric Co.  
In today’s short-term fixed income environment, trade finance and trade receivable assets offer 
several interesting features: attractive alpha yield opportunities, consistent returns, low 
volatility, “real Economy” investment (that is tied to specific commercial transactions) and 
lower defaults rates than any other interest based asset class. Furthermore, its low duration 
provides great diversity benefits as its risk is more contract than market related, making it 
mostly an uncorrelated asset class. However, several challenges stand in the way of a full 
democratization of such assets among a broader pool of investors. 
 
First, most investors lack exposure to and understanding of these assets. Traditionally, trade 
finance is a bank dominated world where the products are focused on the origination side of 
                                                          
15 IIG trade Press release, February 10th, 2014 
16 Aggregated Bloomberg data from SRCH and LSRC between 1/1/2014 and 6/24/2015.  Aaa to Aa3, and Baa1 to Baa3 used, 
assuming a one-year default probability of 0.20%. 
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the business. As a result, it lacks standardized procedures: required documentation can vary 
enormously from deal to deal as trade involves multiple parties across a wide range of 
jurisdictions, bankruptcy laws, tax regimes, and sovereign risk ratings. Many institutional 
investors are currently building the necessary in-house expertise and sector knowledge in order 
to take advantage of this asset class.  
Second, there is the need of streamlining the overall procedures. The lack of consistency in 
terms of due diligence under law, from country to country combined with the increasing cost 
of compliance to regulations, such as Anti-Money Laundering/ Know Your Costumer, call for an 
international standardization and simplification of procedures as well as uniformization of 
financial regulations, bankruptcy rules and payment systems. In other words, while banks 
should aim to implement master agreements for trade finance deals that providing yield, 
security, and granularity in the asset reference pool, policy makers and regulators should help 
standardizing the documentation required.  
Improved document standardization and increased investor awareness of the benefits of trade 
finance assets may have several beneficial consequences. First, it will help in strengthening the 
resilience and in reducing the fragmentation of access to trade funding. Second, the originate 
to distribute trade finance model will help mitigate the issues linked to new banks’ capital 
requirements issues. And third, it will offer investors an uncorrelated and safe/stable asset 
class. However, all this rely on a key and costly element: to put in place the required 
infrastructure (custodians, asset managers, risk mitigation mechanism, etc...). 
Concluding remarks  
Access to finance is often identified as the most important obstacle in business operations, 
especially for SMEs. This is particularly true in Asia, where SMEs are a key player in 
implementing a growth strategy that is geographically and sociologically shared. The 
infrastructure discussed previously meets some specific challenges in the ASEAN region due to 
its heterogeneous degree of economic and financial developments. Figure 4 shows the 
countries’ financial depth (size of the core liabilities over GDP), maturity (fraction of total 
liability held by non-depository financial institutions) and the risk classification provided by the 
OECD, dictating fix the minimum premium rates for credit risk.17 These challenges can be sorted 
around three mains axes of improvements. 
Strengthening and broadening pool of lenders and instruments: Figure 3 suggests that most of 
ASEAN countries strongly rely on banks to have access to funding; hence a resilient and well 
geographically implemented banking network is key. Similarly, corporations are becoming more 
interested in supply chain finance programs as they must insure access to funding to all its 
suppliers, especially in a period of enhanced regulatory burden and in a highly fragmented 
                                                          
17 Core liabilities are retail deposits of domestic household and business while non-core liabilities encompasses the other major 
forms of funding such as lending between banks or foreign lending and include sources for banks and other financial 
intermediaries. 
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region, in terms of currencies, legal jurisdiction, regulations, languages etc… The establishment 
or the strengthening of government-backed export credit insurance and guarantee intuition or 
export-import banks (EXIM) would help mitigating risk and facilitate access to affordable 
funding by reassuring current lenders and attracting more trade finance providers. Similarly, 
international institutions, such as ADB should be supportive of non-bank intermediated trade 
finance instruments. Narain (2015) suggests the creation of an Asia-Pacific Trade Development 
Fund that would provide a collateral-free guarantee mechanism to companies. 
 
[INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE] 
 
Technology assisting trade finance: Dematerialization of trade finance is necessary and new 
technology can ease that process. As an illustration, on-line procurement mechanism and 
electronic repository for information required for trade transactions may help expending 
geographically the network of providers, reducing their costs while enhancing transaction 
transparency. Even B2B direct lending may provide a solution for affordable trade finance 
access to SMEs but the suitable infrastructure need to be created (custodians, legal and 
regulatory framework, better monitoring and risk rating of the markets…).  
Broadening the pool of capital: streamlining the process, that is better infrastructure, more 
reliable risk assessment and easiness to do business, will automatically attract more investors.  
While securitization is at its early stage, it may be the easiest channel to democratize trade 
finance investment. 
Finally, the ASEAN region needs to complement its trade integration with a financial one. Yet 
the later one requires some degrees of economic convergence. A broader participation to GVCs 
may help achieving a shared GDP and employment growth. More specifically, the future 
engagement of SMEs in GVS strongly relies on the existence of an adequate infrastructure: 
access to institutional funding for new or riskier market out of banks’ network, business 
developments services and incentives for larger firms to include SME in their supply chains. 
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FIGURE 1: ASIAN BANKS STEP IN TO LEAD ASIAN TRADE FINANCE DEALS 
 
Source: Factors Chain Annual review (2014) 
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FIGURE 2: ASIAN TRADE FINANCE DEAL VOLUME, BY COUNTRY OF MANDATED LEAD ARRANGER 
 
Source: Dealogic. 
Note: Credit for deal is assigned by the country of the mandated lead arranger, and not of bookrunner 
or lender involvement. 
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FIGURE 1: COUNTRY FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND RISK ASSESSMENT18 
 
Source: Lopez, Markwardt and Savard (2015) 
  
                                                          
18 While the liability information is not available for all ASEAN countries, we can still report the country’s risk 
classification for the remaining ASEAN countries: Brunei(2), Cambodia(6), Laos(7), Myanmar(7), Vietnam(5). The 
scale is from non-rated, for the safest countries to 7 for the riskiest. 
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TABLE 1: BANK-INTERMEDIATED TRADE FINANCE MARKETS IN 2011 
 
          
Country Trade finance (US$ billions)   
Percentage of merchandize 
trade 
  stock annual flows     
Global estimate 1625-2100 6500-8000   30-35 
L/Cs (SWIFT)   2782   15 
ICC trade register   1958   11 
          
China 218 871   47 
Hong Kong SAR 44 131-175   29-38 
India 82 164   41 
Korea 76 304   56 
source: BIS(2014)         
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TABLE 2: ANALYSIS OF SHORT-TERM TRADE FINANCE PRODUCTS - RISK CHARACTERISTICS 
 
          
  
Customer 
default rate (%) 
Moody’s rating with 
same default rate 
Transaction default 
rate (%) 
Global Corporate 
Bond Default Rate19 
Export L/C 
0.03% Aaa-Aa 0.00% 
0.49% 
Import L/C  
0.12% Aa 0.04% 
0.99% 
Performance 
Guarantees 
0.16% Aa-A 0.03% 
2.73% 
Loans for 
Import/Export 
0.24% A-Baa 0.04% 
4.61% 
source: ICC(2014)         
 
 
  
                                                          
19 Average Cumulative Moody’s 10-Year Default Rate. 
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TABLE 3: MAIN SECUTITIZATION DEALS SINCE 2006 
Date Vehicle Issuing Banks Type Details 
2006 Trade CABS I Citibank Synthetic $199 mln, 5 tranches. 
 
2007 Sealane I Standard Chartered Synthetic $3 bln, 4 tranches, $120 mln equity 
tranche, 85% of borrowers from Asia 
Pacific and MENA. 
 
2011 Sealane II Standard Chartered Synthetic $3 bln, 4 tranches, $180 mln equity 
tranche; metal and mining, energy, oil 
and gas, and food and beverage, with 
88% of portfolio from Asia, India, and 
MENA. 
 
2012 Trafigura RBS True sale $430 mln, 2 tranches, oil, metal, coal. 
 
2013 Lighthouse BNP Paribas True sale $132 mln; 4 tranches; oil, metal, 
energy; backed by assets originated by 
Geneva office to mostly commodities 
sourced from Eastern Europe. 
 
2013 CoTrax II-1 Commerzbank Synthetic $500 mln, 3 tranches,  $22 mln 
mezzanine tranche, 74% of portfolio 
(18 countries total) from Asia, Latin 
America, and Russia. 
 
2013 Trade MAPS I Citibank, Santander True sale $1 bln; 4 tranches; top borrowers 
include financial intermediaries, 
agriculture, transportation, oil & gas; 
backed by assets originated by both 
banks' branches or entities in Asia, 
Latin America, Europe, Middle East and 
North America. 
 
2014 TFF I IIG Trade Finance  $220 mln; 3 tranches, $33 mln income 
tranche; backed by non-bank trade 
finance loans; soft commodities (i.e. 
cotton, agriculture, seafood); 
borrowers from Latin America. 
Sources: Bank press releases and prospectuses, Structured Finance News, Trade Finance 
Magazine, Trade and Forfaiting Review. 
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TABLE 4: MAPS I AND COTRAX II-1 UNDERLYING LOAN DISTRIBUTION 
Country of 
Exposure 
% of Loans 
MAPS I  
Country of 
Exposure 
% of Loans 
CoTrax II-1 
United States 86.2 Brazil 23.0 
Latin America  1.0 China 22.0 
Asia  10.9 Panama 12.0 
Europe 1.7 Russian Federation 7.0 
Other  0.1 Other 36.0 
Source: MAPS I prospectus and Krohn (2014). 
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Box1: Definitions20  
Letters of credit (L/Cs) have short-term tenors (less than 90 days). An import L/C is a 
commitment by a bank on behalf of the importer that payment will be made to the exporter, 
provided that the terms and conditions stated in the L/C have been met, as verified through the 
presentation of all required documents. The importer pays his bank a fee to render this service, 
while the goods that are being transacted serve as the bank’s collateral. The exporter, in turn, 
may engage its own bank to provide an export confirmed L/C, which would guarantee the 
payment from the importer’s bank. An L/C is useful whenever reliable credit information about 
a foreign importer is difficult to obtain, but the exporter (or its bank) is satisfied with the 
creditworthiness of the importer’s bank. The L/C protects the importer because no payment 
obligation arises until the goods have been shipped or delivered as promised, removing the risk 
of shipment of goods other than those ordered. 
 
Documentary collections is a transaction whereby the exporter entrusts the collection of 
payment to the remitting bank (exporter’s bank), which in turn sends documents to a collecting 
bank (importer’s bank), along with instructions for payment. Funds are received from the  
importer and remitted to the exporter through the banks involved in the collection in exchange 
for those documents. The banks’ liability is limited to the forwarding and release of documents 
against payment and acceptance or promise of payment by the importer.  
 
Import and export loans, which may entail the bank advancing cash to the importer or exporter 
on presentation of appropriate documentation. This type of financing may also be linked to an 
L/C. 
 
Supply chain finance (SCF) is a relatively new and expanding business area for banks that entails 
combinations of technology and services to facilitate processing and financing of payables and 
receivables within a global supply chain. The supply chains are typically anchored around the 
global purchases and sales of a major retailing or manufacturing firm. The financial services 
within the SCF platform may involve many elements of traditional trade finance (eg pre-
shipment or post-shipment finance, receivables purchases or discounting), with the notable 
exception of letters of credit. Attractions for participants include the possibility of optimising 
payment and financing terms to suppliers and improving working capital both for suppliers and 
sellers. Because the supply chain funding centers on purchase commitments by the buyer, SCF 
offers the possibility of funding rates based on the buyer’s credit worthiness or rating rather 
than on the supplier.  
 
In open account transactions, the exporter extends credit to the importer by shipping and 
delivering goods before payments are due (which is usually within 30 to 90 days). This option is 
the most advantageous to the importer in terms of cash flow and cost, and consequently 
presents the highest risk for the exporter, who is exposed to the risk of non-payment.  
 
In cash-in-advance transactions, the importer pays the exporter upfront, and the associated 
cash flow and settlement risks are reversed. This option is less frequently used.  
 
                                                          
20 See BIS(2014), Appendix 2. 
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Export credit insurance enable exporters to mitigate the risk of non-payment. They can buy the 
insurance from private insurance firms (typically for shorter-term financing) or obtain 
guarantees from public export credit agencies or ECAs (typically for export loans of two years 
or longer). These firms typically insure against default by the importing firm and political risk. 
Banks may also seek ECA guarantees for particular international trade transactions to mitigate 
risks of non-payment from other banks or from customers. 
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Box2: Overall Financing Landscape in Asia since the 07-08 crisis: 
 
Prior to the crisis, Asian countries, especially in the ASEAN region, had been 
dependent on European and US loans, and financing in general. In 2006 $18 billion of 
the total $24 billion of syndicated loans to Singapore were originated outside of Asia, 
an almost ubiquitous pattern throughout the ASEAN group (see Figure B1). 
 
 
FIGURE B1 : SOURCE OF SYNDICATED LOANS IN 2006 AND 2009. SOURCE: BLOOMBERG. 
 
With the unfolding of the financial crisis, however, most European and US banks 
started a deleveraging process that reduced their positions in many ASEAN countries. 
The change in the origin of lenders however was not only limited to a reduction of the 
foreign banks reducing their share of syndicated loans: regional banks provided 
additional loans in comparison to the pre-crisis era. Meaning that regional banks took 
over, or stepped in, to fill the liquidity gap as foreign banks withdrew their 
engagement. 
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During the deleveraging process foreign banks prefer to reduce foreign loans rather 
than those extended to domestic borrowers. Commercial banks, the main providers of 
syndicated loans, seemed to 
have based the decision on 
their engagement in the 
specific countries. The 
deleveraging process, 
therefore, was most marked 
in regions where they 
possessed no established 
subsidiaries or partnerships. 
Figures B4 and B5 
summarizing syndicated 
loans. It is worth noting that 
subsidiaries of foreign banks 
are mostly accounted for in 
the foreign share of loans.  
 
 
FIGURE B2: ORIGIN OF SYNDICATED LOANS AS SHARE OF TOTAL AMOUNT. SOURCE: BLOOMBERG 
Overall, countries with a lower percentage of foreign banks, such as Thailand and 
Malaysia, with 20% and 40% of foreign banks respectively, were more affected by the 
deleveraging process of banks. Local banks had to step in to buffer the withdrawal of 
foreign loans. The main reason being the missing link of a subsidiary or network in the 
specific local to the foreign lending bank. In the case of Malaysia the percentage of 
syndicated loans provided by national banks increased from 11% in 2007 to 48% in 
0
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Other, 21%
FIGURE B2: LOAN PROVIDER (2014) BY SPECIALIZATION. SOURCE: BANKSCOPE. 
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2009, a total increase of $1 billion. Yet, foreign banks remained in financial hub such as 
Singapore.  
 
 
  
FIGURE B3: ORIGIN OF SYNDICATED LOANS AS SHARE OF TOTAL AMOUNT. SOURCE: BLOOMBERG. 
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